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Abstract
In this note, we generalize the results obtained by Barday and Lesur (2005) by considering
a bivariated non separable utility function. We characterize optimal health insurance contracts.
Moreover, we show that under moral hazard a suﬃciently high risk aversion implies that the
optimal coverage and the optimal preventive eﬀort are higher than with perfect information.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
In this paper, we characterize optimal health insurance contracts with moral hazard. In the context of
insurance, moral hazard refers to the impact of insurance on incentives to reduce risk. An individual
facing a risk can take actions to reduce this risk. Shavell (1979) has shown that preventive actions are
discouraged by full coverage. The insurance contracts have to contain a deductible to reduce ex-ante
moral hazard. The optimal contract will balance the risk-sharing beneﬁt of greater insurance with the
incentive beneﬁts of less insurance. This is the main argument in favor of partial coverage for health
insurance in most countries. However health risks have two major eﬀects : a pecuniary one (health
expenditures) and a health related one (health status). Moreover if the pecuniary risk is insurable,
health status is usually uninsurable. Health status modiﬁes the utility provided by wealth. Thus
the way insurance contract deals with pecuniary loss is modiﬁed by health loss. Cook and Graham
(1977) deﬁned irreplaceable commodities as goods which modify the utility provided by wealth. Health
appears to be a perfect example of such a good.
Thus, in order to deal with the problem of health insurance and moral hazard, we consider a bivari-
ate non separable utility function as Rey (2003) who characterizes optimal insurance contracts with
perfect information. Indeed, health status modiﬁes expected utility level and modiﬁes the marginal
utility of wealth. Following Evans and Viscusi (1990) who show that marginal utility of income
increases with health status in the case of severe injuries, we assume that the occurrence of a nonpe-
cuniary uninsurable background loss reduces the marginal utility of wealth. Opposite to Rey (2003),
we show the lack of the importance oh the sign of the variation of the marginal utility of wealth with
respect to the healtl status for the insurers when they want that insureds have incentives to take
preventive actions.
We show that the contract under asymmetric information provides a better coverage than the
ﬁrst best policy. This higher indemnity increases wealth in the illness state and decreases wealth in
t h eh e a l t h ys t a t ed u et ot h ei n c r e a s i n gp r e m i u m .H owever policyholders valuate wealth more in the
healthy state than in the illness state then they increase their eﬀort in order to reduce the premium.
2F r a m e w o r k
We consider a representative consumer. Their preferences are described by a bivariate utility function
U(W,H)w i t hW being the initial wealth and H being the health status. U is increasing and concave
in each term U1 > 0,U 11 < 0,U 2 > 0,U 22 < 0. The occurrence of a permanent loss in health can
increase, decrease or can leave the individual’s marginal utility of wealth unchanged. Three cases are
possible : U12 < 0o rU12 =0o rU12 > 0. In the ﬁeld od health insurance, the marginal utility of
income can increase or stay unchanged with health status in the case of severe injuries (Carthy et al.,
1999 ; Sloan et al., 1998 ; Viscusi and Evans, 1990) and can decrease for minor injuries (Evans and
Viscusi, 1991).
We assume that policyholders face a malignant risk. In case of illness, the consumer has to pay
care expenditures L in order to recover his health status less a permanent loss δh>0. This malignant
risk appaers with a probility p. The agent can decrease this probability taking preventive actions e ≥ 0
with a cost per unit of level eﬀort.We assume p ≡ p(e)w i t hp0(e) < 0a n dp00(e) ≥ 0. The health risk
is undeterministic since p(0) < 1a n dlime7→∞p(e) > 0. For the current problem, however p0(0) = −∞
and convexity of p(e)a r es u ﬃcient conditions for the second-order conditions of the problem of the
incentive compatibility constraint of insured. They choose a preventive eﬀort level not only to reduce
the ﬁnancial risk but also to protect against the insurable health risk.
Insurers are competing in contracts to fullﬁll the demand for health insurance. A contract is a
couple (π,q), where π is the premium and q is the indemnity to be paid in case of illness.
3 Perfect information
With perfect information, the optimal contract maximizes expected utility subject to zero proﬁt
constraint, or participation from the insured :
2max
q,π,x [(1 − p(x))U(w − π − cx,H)+p(x)U(w + q − π − L − cx,H − δh)]
s.t. π = p(x)q
(1)
The optimal contract propoerties are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 Perfect information contract has the following properties :
if U12 < 0 policyholders prefer over insurance
if U12 =0policyholders prefer full insurance
if U12 > 0 policyholders prefer underinsurance
Proof. First order condition are
δ$
δx = p0(x)[U(w +( 1− p(x))q − L − cx,h − δh) − U(w − p(x)q − cx,h)]
−[c + p0(x)q]
∙
(1 − p(x))U1(w − p(x)q − cx,h)




δq =( 1 − p(x))p(x)
∙
U1(w +( 1− p(x))q − L − cx,h − δh)




The second equation is equivalent to
U1(w +( 1− p(x))q − L − cx,h − δh)=U1(w − p(x)q − cx,h)( 3 )






=( 1 − p(x))p(x)
∙
U1(w − p(x)L − cx,h − δh)
−U1(w − p(x)L − cx,h)
¸
T h es i g no ft h i se x p r e s s i o nd e p e n d so nt h es i g no fU12. Three cases are possible.




> 0. We deduce that q∗ >L .




=0 .W ed e d u c et h a tq∗ = L.




< 0. We deduce that q∗ <L .
Rewriting FOC1, we obtain
−p0(x)[U(w − p(x)q∗ − cx,h) − U(w +( 1− p(x))q∗ − L − cx,h − δh)]
−p0(x)q∗U1(w − p(x)q∗ − cx,h)
= cU1(w − p(x)q∗ − cx,h)
Deﬁning the optimal preventive eﬀort.
When marginal utility of wealth is increasing in health status, policyholders want to reduce in-
demnity since a monetary unit provides a higher marginal utility in the healthy state rather than in
the illness state due to the health status loss. However, the utility in healthy state is larger than the
one in the illness state.
4 Asymmetric information
With ex ante moral hazard, the level of preventive eﬀort cannot be contracted for since it is un-
observable by the insurer. Rather than omitting the eﬀort from the contract, we consider it as a
contractual parameter and restrict the set of contracts with an incentive compatibility constraint.
The optimal contract maximizes expected utility subject to the zero proﬁtc o n s t r a i n to ft h ei n s u r e r
and the incentive compatibility constraint of the insured.
3The optimal contract is solution of the following program:
max
q,π,x [(1 − p(x))U(w − π − cx,h)+p(x)U(w + q − π − L − cx,h − δh)]
s.t. π − p(x)q =0
−p0(x)
∙
U(w − π − cx,h)




p(x)U1(w + q − π − L − cx,h − δh)




We can substitute π using the zero proﬁt constraint in the above program and so deﬁne x(q)a st h e
solution in x to the incentive compatibility constraint. This yields expected utility as a function of q




(1 − p(x(q)))U(w − p(x(q))q − cx(q),h)
+p(x(q))U(w + q − p(x(q))q − L − cx(q),h− δh)
¸
(5)
The optimal coverage veriﬁes the following condition
δEU(q)
∂q = −db x
dqp0(b x)q
∙
(1 − p)U1(w − p(x)q − cb x,h)
+pU1(w +( 1− p(x))q − L − cb x,h − δh)
¸
+(p(b x)(1− p(b x)))
∙
U1(w +( 1− p(x))q − L − cb x,h − δh)




This ﬁrst-order condition depends on the sign of db x
dq and the diﬀerence between U1(w − π − L + q −
cb x,h − δh)a n dU1(w − π − cb x,h).




cp(b x)(1 − p(x∗))
< −
∙
U11(w +( 1− θ)q∗ − L − cb x,h − δh)
−U11(w − θq∗ − cb x,h)
¸
U1(w − p(x)q∗ − cb x,h)
(7)
Proof. Fully Diﬀerentiating the incentive constraint and after computations, we obtain that
db x
dq
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
q∗
=
−p0(b x)U1(w − p(x)q∗ − cb x,h)
+c
∙
p(b x)(1 − θ)U11(w +( 1− θ)q∗ − L − cb x,h − δh)




U(w +( 1− θ)q∗ − L − cb x,h − δh)




p(b x)U11(w +( 1− θ)q∗ − L − cb x,h − δh)
+(1− p(b x))U11(w − θq∗ − cb x,h)
¸
(8)
The level of eﬀort is increasing in the indemnity in the neighborhood of ﬁrst best contract if and only
if the above expression is negative.
Assuming the existence of preventive action with asymmetric information, we know that U(w +( 1−
θ)q∗ − L − cb x,h − δh) <U(w − θq∗ − cb x,h) which implies that
p00(b x)
∙
U(w +( 1− θ)q∗ − L − cb x,h − δh)




p(b x)U11(w +( 1− θ)q∗ − L − cb x,h − δh)







q∗ is positive is and only if
−p0(b x)U1(w − p(x)q∗ − cb x,h)
+c
∙
p(b x)(1 − θ)U11(w +( 1− θ)q∗ − L − cb x,h − δh)
−(1 − p(b x))θU11(w − θq∗ − cb x,h)
¸
< 0 (10)
4which is equivalent to
−p0(b x)
c U1(w − p(x)q∗ − cb x,h)
< −
∙
p(b x)(1 − θ)U11(w +( 1− θ)q∗ − L − cb x,h − δh)
−(1 − p(b x))θU11(w − θq∗ − cb x,h)
¸
(11)
Considering the eﬀect in the neighborhood of the ﬁrst best contract implies that θ = p(x∗)s i n c e
π∗ = p(x∗)q∗.M o r e o v e r w e m u s t h a v e ˆ x<x ∗ since ˆ x is the solution of the incentive constraint
where policyholders neglect the eﬀect of their eﬀort on the premium whereas x∗ is the solution of the
same constraint where policyholders take this eﬀect into account. Then p(b x) > θ and p(b x)(1 − θ) >




p(b x)(1 − θ)U11(w +( 1− θ)q∗ − L − cb x,h − δh)





p(b x)(1 − θ)U11(w +( 1− θ)q∗ − L − cb x,h − δh)
−p(b x)(1 − θ)U11(w − θq∗ − cb x,h)
¸
= −p(b x)(1 − θ)
∙
U11(w +( 1− θ)q∗ − L − cb x,h − δh)
−U11(w − θq∗ − cb x,h)
¸







Corollary 3 The optimal coverage is higher under asymmetric information than under perfect infor-
mation.
Proof. Evaluating equation 6 with the ﬁrst best coverage, we obtain
δEU(q)
∂q







(1 − p(b x))U1(w − π − cb x,h)
+p(b x)U1(w − π − L + q∗ − cb x,h − δh)
¸
(14)
If the above condition is veriﬁed then this expression is always strictly positive. It implies that the
optimal coverage q verifying condition 6 is higher with asymmetric information than with perfect
information.
Due to the asymmetry of information, insurers have to distort the coverage they oﬀer from the
ﬁrst best coverage. However if the absolute risk aversion computed for healthy state is suﬃciently
higher than the absolute risk aversion in the illness state, this distortion should lead to an increase
in the indemnity rather than a decrease as it should be the case in Shavell’s model. This is due to
the fact that an increase in the indemnity implies that the policyholder is richer in the unhealthy
state than in the healthy state. However wealth is less valuated in case of bad health than in case of
good health. This gives incentives to increase prevention eﬀort since it decreases its premium which
increases wealth in the healthy state.
5 Conclusion
Health insurance should take into account health expenditures which is monetary losses i.e. also
health status loss (disability for example). We introduce health status consideration in moral hazard
problem on the insurance markets. As Bardey and Lesur (2005), we show that under conditions, the
health status loss gives incentives to increase preventive action. Moreover, we show that under moral
hazard, at the equilibrium, the coverage is higher than the ﬁrst best one. This point is in contradiction
with the well-known result of Shavell (1979) about the necessity of a deductible in insurance contracts
under moral hazard and with result of Bardey and Lesur (2005) about the existence of ﬁrst best
contract under moral hazard..
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